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Abstract 
This paper aims to explore an effective green incentive mechanism for government 
to develop traditional tourism into green tourism by establishing a dynamic 
evolutionary game model among governments, tourism enterprises, and tourists. We 
first discuss the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) regarding green innovation and its 
corresponding conditions for each stakeholder, and then analyze the ESS between 
tourism enterprises and tourists, with and without consideration of government green 
supervision. The optimal green incentive condition for driving all stakeholders to 
conduct green behavior is identified. More importantly, we advise the government to 
first implement green incentive mechanism in the areas where the tourism market scale 
is relatively small. Additionally, we utilize numerical examples to illustrate the findings 
and provide some managerial insights. 
Keywords: Sustainable tourism; Green preference; Green innovation; Government 
incentive mechanism; Evolutionary game theory 
 
Introduction 
In recent decades, protecting the environment, improving the utilization rate of 
natural resources, and achieving the sustainable development of humans and nature 
have attracted enormous attention among people throughout the world (Buckley, 2012). 
China is no exception to this trend. China’s economic development, over the last 
decades, has accelerated and also produced a negative impact on the ecological 
environment (Simões, 2016). From the report released by Asian Development Bank, 
less than 1% of the 500 largest Chinese cities meet the air quality standards suggested 
by the World Health Organization, and 7 of its cities are in the list of the 10 most 
polluted cities in the world (Zhang & Crooks, 2012). As an important part of China’s 
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tertiary sector, the tourism industry, which witnessed a rapid growth in 2010 with 935 
million international and 2103 million domestic tourist arrivals (Yan, 2013), has been 
growing rapidly. Meanwhile, the tourism industry has consumed a considerable amount 
of water, energy, and disposable products owing to the nature and characteristics of its 
services, resulting in serious contamination of the atmosphere, oceans, soil, biota, fresh-
water, etcetera; besides, the purchase of raw materials, manufacture of tourism products, 
and disposal of used products has also damaged the ecological environment (Chu & 
Chung, 2016; Gössling et al., 2012; Han & Haejin, 2015). Although the Chinese 
government has paid much attention to environmental protection since 1995, the trade-
off between environmental problems and economic growth is still the most delicate 
question that it currently faces (Chen, Wang, & Feng, 2016).  
With the popularization of environmental protection, consumers are increasingly 
willing to change their consumption lifestyles by exhibiting more eco-friendly behavior 
and willingness-to-pay for green products to reduce environmental pollution. For 
example, consumers in the United Kingdom (U.K.), spent GBP 38 billion in their 
pursuit of green alternatives1. As indicated by Budeanu and Chesworth (2007) and Su 
and Swanson (2017), tourists’ demands for green tourism have been growing in the past 
few decades. This implies that the green operation of firms is becoming essential to 
maintaining enterprise competitiveness or capturing a greater market share and many 
tourism enterprises have been striving to invent new eco-friendly products to attract 
and target more tourists (Chen & Chai, 2010; Han & Haejin, 2015). However, green 
tourism enterprises face a significantly higher investment and a longer payback period 
than traditional ones. Additionally, some local governments have paid more attention 
to economic indicators than environmental impact. Consequently, it is a matter of 
utmost urgency for the Chinese government to make sure that the public responds 
positively to the sustainable development policies by coming up with some effective 
mechanisms. Considering this background, this paper is dedicated to answering the 
following research questions:  
(1) How does the central government motivate tourism stakeholders to select green 
tourism? 
                                                        
1Rodionova Z., Independent (2014) “Ethical spending surges to $38bn in UK as consumers look to green 
alternatives.”http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/ethical-spending-surges-to-38bnin-uk-as-
consumers-look-to-green-alternatives-a6790956.html 
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(2) Under what conditions does each stakeholder have a stable strategy from a long-
term perspective?  
(3) What are the evolutionary stable strategies and corresponding conditions of the 
dynamic system, with and without government green supervision? 
(4) How would the factors, such as green incentive intensity of local governments, 
brand benefit of tourism enterprises, and green preferences of tourists affect the 
decision of each stakeholder? 
This paper proposes a dynamic evolutionary game model to address the above 
questions. Evolutionary game theory is the self-organization process by which a 
population of individual evolves into the expected distribution of individual behaviors 
based on participants learning (Weibull, 1997). The pivotal concept of evolutionary 
game theory is the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) first proposed by Smith and Price 
(1973), which can be defined as a strategy 𝑆∗  satisfying two conditions: (1) 
𝐸(𝑆∗, 𝑆∗) ≥ 𝐸(𝑆, 𝑆∗) for all 𝑆 ≠ 𝑆∗and (2) 𝐸(𝑆∗, 𝑆) > 𝐸(𝑆, 𝑆), where 𝐸 denotes the 
payoff function and 𝑆 represents the possible strategy other than 𝑆∗ (Barari et al., 
2012). The replicator dynamic proposed by Taylor and Jonker (1978) is a dynamic 
differential analysis method, which is widely used to investigate the long-term strategic 
stability of stakeholders. The core idea of replicator dynamic analysis is that if one 
strategy gains more than the average income of other strategies during the game process, 
it indicates that the strategy is suitable for the evolution of the group. In other words, 
the strategy has stability as an invasion strategy and can evolve into a stable strategy 
through repeated games.  
Based on the evolutionary game theory, we first discuss the ESS concerning green 
innovation for each stakeholder. Then, we analyze the ESS between tourism enterprises 
and tourists, with and without consideration of the local governments’ green 
supervision policy. The research results show that the decisions of stakeholders can 
interact with each other under certain conditions. It is worth noting that local 
governments’ supervision behavior cannot directly affect the purchasing decision of 
tourists, but it can indirectly drive tourists to accept the green tourism pattern by 
encouraging tourism enterprises to sell green products. The findings also highlight that 
enhancing brand benefit of tourism enterprises and/or green preference of tourists is an 
extremely useful method to stimulate stakeholders to adopt green tourism. Through the 
numerical experiment, we conclude that the initial states of stakeholders taking part in 
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green activities can only affect the short-term decisions of all participants, whereas the 
evolutionary stable conditions can determine the decision making of each stakeholder 
from a long-term perspective. Moreover, we propose a green incentive mechanism and 
identify the optimal conditions of green incentive intensity to achieve the ideal green 
tourism pattern. We further suggest that the government should first implement green 
incentive mechanism in the areas where the scale of tourism is relatively small. The 
management implications could benefit the development of modern tourism industry, 
as well as promote the implementation of the government’s sustainable development 
policies. 
The paper starts with a review of relevant literature on sustainable tourism and 
dynamic game theory. The second part describes the basic model and its corresponding 
assumptions. The third part presents the ESS for each stakeholder and its corresponding 
stable conditions, and numerical examples are employed to discuss the impacts of some 
key parameters. The conclusions and managerial insights for sustainable tourism 
development are proposed in the final section of the paper.  
Literature review  
This paper draws on, and contributes to, two distinct streams of literature— 
sustainable tourism and dynamic game theory.  
Sustainable tourism  
Since China vowed to incorporate sustainable development into its policies in 
1995, it has become a buzzword in the operational management field on which many 
researchers have focused (Huang et al., 2008; Lu & Nepal, 2009; Liu et al., 2014). As 
one of the main driving forces of China’s economic development, tourism has led to 
some environmental issues (Tang et al., 2011). Some researchers have investigated 
green consumption from the perspectives of tourists, firms, and society, and suggested 
that tourism enterprises should shift their focus from the supply side to the demand side 
for sustainable development (Budeanu & Chesworth, 2007; Kastenholz, 2004; 
Swarbrooke, 1999). With the general trend of sustainable development, the tour 
operators have faced enormous pressure related to environmental protection in the past 
ten years, exerted by government, economics, culture, and society (Chu & Chung, 
2016). Roberts and Tribe (2008) indicated that small tourism enterprises automatically 
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contribute to sustainable tourism development by offering personalized tours. Some 
scholars (Saarinen, 2014; Zhao, Chen, &Liu, 2015) have confirmed that government 
regulation is a useful method that encourages civil enterprises to turn traditional tourism 
into sustainable tourism to a large extent. A large number of studies have investigated 
the characteristics of green guests, motivations for green consumption, and the impacts 
of green attributes on tourist satisfaction (Peattie, 2010; Kasim, 2004). Jinsoo, Hsu, Han, 
and Yunhi (2010) investigated how guests visit green hotels and concluded that the set 
of impressions made by green hotels could lead to more beneficial behavioral intentions. 
Kim, Hlee, and Joun (2016) stated that the green practices of hotels could enhance 
customers’ satisfaction, but that this happens only through perceiving the relative 
quality of service. Lin and Huang (2012) confirmed that environmentally friendly 
consumers express stronger favor for, and higher satisfaction with, green products. 
Moreover, anthropocentric or eco-centric values could significantly influence people’s 
attitudes towards sustainable tourism development (Xu & Fox, 2014). Some studies in 
environmental psychology have proved that increasing the environmental awareness of 
consumers would influence their purchasing behavior (see Bagozzi & Dholakia, 2006; 
Miller et al., 2010; Chen & Tung, 2014). Additionally, the theme of “attitude-behavior 
gap” has also been widely studied by Vermeir and Verbeke (2006). They claimed that 
people’s positive attitudes (intentions) do not lead to the actual purchase of green items 
or participation in environmental activities. As for tour firms, they often make 
production plans on the basis of market demand and operational costs. Therefore, it is 
more realistic to consider the purchase behavior of tourists while analyzing the decision 
making of tourism enterprises. As Buckley (2012) found, mainstream tourism was still 
far from implementing sustainable development. So far, few researches have explored 
the incentive mechanism that could motivate tourism stakeholders to implement green 
innovation. 
Dynamic game theory  
Dynamic game theory mainly studies the decision behavior among participants by 
considering the time factor in sequential, differential, evolutionary, repeated, and 
stochastic games. This theory has been widely used to investigate the pricing decisions 
in the field of operational management (Baldacci et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2016). Some 
researchers have employed the dynamic game method to discuss the game behavior 
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among tourism stakeholders (Huang et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2015; Zyl, 2012). Their 
research results have shown that tour operators often consider the rivals’ decision 
behavior when they are creating their operational schemes. Wie (2005) built a dynamic 
game model to explore the capacity investment strategy in the cruise line industry. He 
found the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution by using Pontryagin’s maximum 
principle. García and Tugores (2006) constructed a vertical differential game model by 
considering both quality and price competition of hotels in a duopoly market and found 
the optimal service quality and price decisions. Blanco, Lozano, and Rey-maquieira 
(2009) utilized a dynamic approach to analyze the voluntary environmental 
contributions in the tourism industry. They indicated that the stable equilibria with 
(without) voluntary environmental initiatives could coexist under certain conditions. Li 
(2011) applied a sequential game model to discuss the strategic interaction between 
competitive and complementary destinations, and suggested that rational decision 
makers should choose moderate strategies instead of aggressive ones for sustainable 
development. Guo et al. (2013) and Ling et al. (2014) explored the optimal pricing 
strategy for hotels when hotel managers operate an online channel by cooperating with 
a third-party website. Both of them proposed a coordination strategy for the hotels and 
third party website to achieve a win-win situation. By comparing the sequential game 
with price competition, Yang, Ji, and Chen (2016) investigated the pricing setting in a 
tourism supply chain consisting of a hotel and an online travel agency. Encarnação et 
al. (2016) utilized evolutionary game theory to discuss the complex interactions among 
state, business, and civil sectors. They highlighted that public sectors act as significant 
driving forces in the civil sectors' shifting. Zhang and Weatherford (2017) applied the 
dynamic pricing method to the hotel industry for network revenue management. The 
above studies have shown that taking the time factor into account is more in line with 
reality due to the complexity and changeability of tourism problems. However, the 
majority of the above studies investigated the issues of dynamic pricing or strategic 
interaction in tourism industry by considering one or two stakeholders and ignoring the 
government. Our research is different from the previous studies mentioned above in 
that it focuses on stability analysis of green innovation strategy among three key 
tourism stakeholders by using a long-term perspective.  
Some of the aforementioned studies do consider the dynamic game behavior 
among stakeholders but most of them assume that the participants are completely 
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rational. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that a tripartite game of the 
type developed in Santos et al. (2016) and Encarnação et al. (2016) has been applied to 
green tourism innovation that involves local governments, tourism enterprises, and 
tourists by taking a long-term perspective. We establish a tripartite evolutionary game 
model to explore the incentive mechanism for sustainable tourism by introducing the 
green certification scheme 2  (Dunk, Gillespie, & Macleod, 2016). Particularly, we 
discuss the strategy stability for each stakeholder, regarding the choices of game 
members as a gradual learning process owing to their long-term imitative behavior 
(Blanco, Lozano, & Rey-maquieira, 2009). On the basis of the triple bottom line (TBL) 
of economic responsibility, environmental responsibility, and social responsibility 
(Elkington, 1998), we incorporate green policy support of central government, brand 
benefit of tourism enterprises, and the green preference of tourists into our models, and 
analyze the strategic interaction of green innovation among the three key stakeholders. 
Model description  
This section first describes the model assumptions and notation. Then, the payoff 
of stakeholders is proposed. Based on the payoff, the corresponding replicator dynamic 
equations of participants are finally established. 
Model Assumption 
In China, the government often represents public interest, carrying out public 
governance and allocating public resources within its administrative jurisdiction. As 
Huang & Chen (2005) put it, the overuse of common resources would result in the 
tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968) without effective regulation and a perfect legal 
system. To encourage enterprises to adopt green operational pattern, local government 
departments (e.g., local environmental protection bureau, commodity inspection bureau, 
etc.) need to invest a certain amount of resources to supervise enterprises’ green 
production and carbon emission. Without loss of generality, we assume the given green 
standard 𝑔0 = 0, which is used to distinguish tourism enterprises’ green behavior by 
government (Zhu & He, 2016). When the green degree of tourism firms’ products is 
                                                        
2The green certification scheme is used to judge whether enterprises carry out the green operation mandated by 
government. When the enterprises are recognized as green enterprises, the government will provide them some 
subsidy. Otherwise, they will be given an appropriate punishment. 
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green (𝑔 > 0), the government supervision departments (hereafter local governments) 
will reward the firms with corresponding green subsidy 𝑇 per unit product. However, 
when the products are identified as non-green (𝑔 < 0), the firms will be punished with 
penalty 𝑇 per unit product (we call 𝑇 as green incentive intensity). Owing to the 
positive green supervision behavior, local governments can obtain additional benefit 
𝑈𝑔 (hereafter green policy support) by paying an additional supervision cost 𝐶𝑔. The 
green policy support is often provided by central government in various forms, such as 
financial support and/or affirming the local governments’ work performance due to the 
positive responses to the sustainable development policy. Obviously, green policy 
support is related to the local governments’ green supervision behavior and the 
parameters 𝑈𝑔  and 𝐶𝑔  are independent of the market demand
3  𝑄 . If the local 
governments do not implement the green supervision, they will not obtain this support 
from central government and the benefit will be 0 or −𝐶𝑤, depending on the decision 
of the tourism enterprises (𝐶𝑤 denotes additional environmental governance cost of 
local governments due to the contamination caused by traditional tourism). 
In the current paper, it is assumed that the tourism enterprises have the 
characteristics of rational economic agents, that is., they pursue maximum profit. On 
the one hand, tourism enterprises consider their own business objectives and marketing 
plans based on production cost and sales revenue. On the other hand, they are sensitive 
to the consumers’ perception and government regulations. In practice, many enterprises 
believe that undertaking social responsibility can benefit them owing to the 
unquantifiable extra boost it gives to their brands (Panda, Modak, Basu, & Goyal, 2015; 
Su & Swanson, 2017). Thus, securing the long-run support from stakeholders towards 
the corporations has become a significant issue(Serra-Cantallops, Peña-Miranda, 
Ramón-Cardona, & Martorell-Cunill, 2017). Accordingly, if the tourism firms adopt a 
green innovation strategy (undertaking social responsibility), they can obtain additional 
average expected benefit 𝑏 (hereafter brand benefit) per unit product, which may be 
influenced by public admiration. We focus here on the average value of the brand 
benefit due to its complexity, which could be obtained by survey research, and the 
public here does not only mean tourists but also local residents and other relevant 
                                                        
3The supervision cost of Government is often presented for a period of time, such as a month. So, we consider 
here the demand for one month, which can be regard as a constant due to relative short-term stability and 
predictability. 
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stakeholders. As an example, the local residents would like to recommend their admired 
tourism enterprises to the tourists. Thus, the parameter 𝑏 is related to the firms’ green 
decision but is independent of the tourists’ purchase behavior. Owing to green 
production and/or carbon emission control, green firms have to pay additional cost 𝑐. 
Without loss of generality, we normalize the unit production cost of non-green products 
𝑐0 = 0. Besides, tourism enterprises can obtain corresponding subsidy 𝑇𝑄 or penalty 
– 𝑇𝑄 from local governments, depending on their decisions during the sales period. 
They can also earn total sales revenue (𝑝1𝑄  or 𝑝2𝑄  or 0) under the purchasing 
behavior of tourists, where 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are the unit prices of green products and non-
green products, respectively. It is reasonable to assume 𝑝1 > 𝑝2 due to the additional 
cost incurred for green products. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Payoff of stakeholders 
Note: Decision Tree is a decision support tool that uses a tree-like graph or model of decisions and 
their possible consequences, including decision nodes, scheme branches, chance event outcomes 
(state nodes), and payoff (utility). 
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As for tourists, they can get basic value 𝑈 if they purchase green products . 
Many studies have demonstrated that consumers buying green products usually confirm 
that green products can bring them additional green preference benefit (thereafter green 
preference) 𝑟 ≥ 0 owing to their environmental awareness (Jinsoo et al., 2010; Lin & 
Huang, 2012; Zhu & He, 2016). Particularly, if local governments adopt green 
supervision strategy that can improve ecological environment, all citizens, including 
tourists, can get additional social environmental benefit 𝑈𝑐 (i.e., good health). 
Consequently, the tourists can acquire total product revenue (𝑈 − 𝑝1 + 𝑟)𝑄 during 
the sales period and the social environmental benefit 𝑈𝑐 when they buy green products 
under the condition that local governments implement green supervision. They can 
obtain revenue (𝑈 − 𝑝2)𝑄 by buying traditional tourism products without supervision 
(to make economic sense, we assume 𝑈 > 𝑝2 but 𝑝1 may be bigger than 𝑈 due to 
the additional cost of green product). Based on the above assumptions, we can obtain 
the payoff of tourism stakeholders shown in Fig. 1. 
Model framework 
According to the aforementioned replicator dynamic analysis method, we let 𝑥 
denote the proportion of the population of local governments implementing green 
supervision; so, (1 − 𝑥) represents the proportion adopting a non-supervision strategy. 
Likewise, the rate of adoption of green) tourism strategy and traditional tourism 
strategy by enterprises is 𝑦 and (1 − 𝑦), respectively. Furthermore, 𝑧 and (1 − 𝑧) 
stand for the proportion of the tourist population purchasing green tourism products and 
not purchasing them, respectively. From the foregoing payoff in Fig. 1, the expected 
and average revenue of local governments can be expressed by the following equations. 
{
 
 
 
 
𝐸Π𝑔
𝑥 = 𝑦(𝑧(𝑈𝑔 − 𝐶𝑔 − 𝑇𝑄) + (1 − 𝑧)(𝑈𝑔 − 𝐶𝑔)) + (1 − 𝑦)(𝑧(𝑈𝑔 − 𝐶𝑔)
                              +(1 − 𝑧)(𝑈𝑔 + 𝑇𝑄 − 𝐶𝑔 − 𝐶𝑤))
𝐸Π𝑔
1−𝑥 = 𝑦(𝑧 ∙ 0 + (1 − 𝑧) ∙ 0) + (1 − 𝑦)(𝑧 ∙ 0 + (1 − 𝑧)𝐶𝑤)                   
𝐸Π𝑔 = 𝑥Π𝑔
𝑥 + (1 − 𝑥)Π𝑔
1−𝑥                                                                                 
   (1) 
From Eq. (1), we can obtain the replicator dynamic equation of local governments’ 
decision making, as shown below: 
  𝐹(𝑥) =
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑥(𝐸𝛱𝑔
𝑥 − 𝐸𝛱𝑔) = 𝑥(1 − 𝑥)[𝑈𝑔 − 𝐶𝑔 + (1 − 𝑦 − 𝑧)𝑄𝑇]     (2) 
where 𝐹(𝑥)  represents the rate of change of local governments selecting 
supervision strategy. When 𝐹(𝑥) < 0, it means the proportion 𝑥 of local governments 
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choosing supervision strategy evolves to 0, whereas 𝐹(𝑥) > 0  indicates that 𝑥 
evolves to 1 over time. It can be found that the rate of change of strategy is not only 
related to the probability but also correlated to the gap between expected revenue on 
adopting supervision strategy and the average expected revenue. 
Similar to the modeling process for the replicator dynamic equation of local 
governments, we can obtain the expected and average revenue of tourism enterprises 
and their replicator dynamic equation, as shown in Eqs. (3) and (4). 
{
 
 
 
 
𝐸Π𝑓
𝑦 = 𝑥(𝑧(𝑝1 − 𝑐 + 𝑏 + 𝑇)𝑄 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑏𝑄)             
              +(1 − 𝑥)(𝑧(𝑝1 − 𝑐 + 𝑏)𝑄 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑏𝑄)
𝐸Π𝑓
1−𝑦 = 𝑥(1 − 𝑧)(𝑝2 − 𝑇)𝑄 + (1 − 𝑥)(1 − 𝑧)𝑝2𝑄
𝐸Π𝑓 = 𝑦Π𝑓
𝑦 + (1 − 𝑦)Π𝑓
1−𝑦                                            
           (3) 
𝐹(𝑦) =
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑦(𝐸Π𝑓
𝑦 − 𝐸Π𝑓) = 𝑦(1 − 𝑦)𝑄[𝑇𝑥 + 𝑧(𝑝2 + 𝑝1 − 𝑐) + 𝑏 − 𝑝2]  (4) 
Following the same logic as used earlier, the expected and average revenue of 
tourists are given as follows: 
{
𝐸Π𝑐
𝑧 = 𝑥(𝑦((𝑈 − 𝑝1 + 𝑟)𝑄 + 𝑈𝑐) + (1 − 𝑦)𝑈𝑐) + (1 − 𝑥)(𝑦(𝑈 − 𝑝1 + 𝑟)𝑄)
𝐸Π𝑐
1−𝑧 = 𝑥(𝑦𝑈𝑐 + (1 − 𝑦)((𝑈 − 𝑝2)𝑄 + 𝑈𝑐)) + (1 − 𝑥)(1 − 𝑦)(𝑈 − 𝑝2)𝑄   
𝐸Π𝑐 = 𝑧Π𝑐
𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)Π𝑐
1−𝑧                                                                                            
 (5) 
Consequently, the replicator dynamic equation concerning tourists’ strategy can 
be given by 
𝐹(𝑧) =
𝑑𝑧
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑧(𝐸Π𝑐
𝑧 − 𝐸Π𝑐) = (1 − 𝑧)𝑧𝑄[𝑦(2𝑈 + 𝑟 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2) − (𝑈 − 𝑝2)] (6) 
By observing the replicator dynamic equations (2), (4), and (6) of stakeholders, 
we can obtain Observation 1 below: 
 
Observation 1.  
(i) The local governments’ supervision policy significantly affects the green 
innovation decision of tourism enterprises, but it cannot directly affect the 
purchasing behavior of tourists. The decisions of tourism enterprises and/or 
tourists can impact local governments’ strategy to some extent. 
(ii) The social environmental benefit 𝑈𝑐 and additional environmental governance 
cost 𝐶𝑤 cannot impact the decisions of participants. 
 
Observation 1 shows the strategic interaction among stakeholders and indicates 
that it is not necessary for participants to consider all factors because some of them, 
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such as social environmental benefit and additional environmental governance cost, 
cannot affect the stability of the dynamic system from a long-term perspective. In reality, 
the government does regard the theory that controlling pollution before it occurs will 
save disposal costs later as an advanced environmental management concept of 
sustainable development.  
Model analysis 
In this section of the paper, we will explore the long-term stable states of the 
strategies of stakeholders and the ESS of the dynamic system. We first analyze the 
strategy stability of each stakeholder by utilizing dynamic differential analysis method. 
Strategy stability analysis of local governments 
From Observation 1, we know that local governments’ decision making is affected 
by the strategies of tourism enterprises and tourists. To facilitate analysis, we let 𝑦′ =
𝑈𝑔−𝐶𝑔+𝑄𝑇(1−𝑧)
𝑄𝑇
 or 𝑧′ =
𝑈𝑔−𝐶𝑔+𝑄𝑇(1−𝑦)
𝑄𝑇
 represent the roots of 𝐹(𝑥) = 0, except at 𝑥 = 0 
and 𝑥 = 1. It can be easily found that 𝑦′ and 𝑧′ have symmetry, so we take 𝑦′ as an 
example to analyze the strategy stability of local governments. 
When 𝑦 = 𝑦′, it’s obvious that 𝐹(𝑥) ≡ 0 is right for any 𝑥. It means that any 
regulatory strategy of local governments is a stable strategy at this time. The initial 
strategy chosen does not change over time, that is, green tourism cannot be promoted 
over time. When 𝑦 ≠ 𝑦′, we can obtain two possible evolutionary stable points with 
𝐹(𝑥) = 0, at 𝑥1 = 0 and 𝑥2 = 1. By taking the first derivative of 𝐹(𝑥) with respect 
to 𝑥, we obtain the following equation. 
𝐹′(𝑥) = (1 − 2𝑥)[𝑈𝑔 − 𝐶𝑔 + (1 − 𝑦 − 𝑧)𝑄𝑇]             (7) 
Owing to 0 ≤ 𝑦, 𝑧 ≤ 1, we can derive that (1 − 𝑦 − 𝑧)𝑄𝑇 ≥ −𝑄𝑇. From Eq. (7), 
it can be concluded that when 𝑈𝑔 > 𝐶𝑔 + 𝑄𝑇, then 𝑈𝑔 − 𝐶𝑔 + (1 − 𝑦 − 𝑧)𝑄𝑇 > 0, 
which results in 𝐹′(𝑥)|𝑥=1 < 0 for any 𝑦 and 𝑧. Likewise, when 𝑈𝑔 > 𝐶𝑔 + 𝑄𝑇𝑦, 
it implies that 𝑈𝑔 − 𝐶𝑔 − 𝑦𝑄𝑇 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑄𝑇 > 0. Therefore, we can get 𝐹
′(𝑥)|𝑥=1 <
0 for any 𝑧 . Furthermore, when 𝐶𝑔 − (1 − 𝑧)𝑄𝑇 < 𝑈𝑔 < 𝐶𝑔 +𝑄𝑇𝑦, suppose that 
𝑦 < min (1, 𝑦′) ; then, it can be easily found that 𝐹′(𝑥)|𝑥=1 < 0 ; however, if 
max (0, 𝑦′) < 𝑦 < 1, we can work out that 𝐹′(𝑥)|𝑥=0 < 0. Last, when 𝑈𝑔 < 𝐶𝑔 −
(1 − 𝑧)𝑄𝑇, it can be proved that 𝑈𝑔 − 𝐶𝑔 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑄𝑇 − 𝑦𝑄𝑇 < 0, which implies 
that 𝐹′(𝑥)|𝑥=0 < 0 for any 𝑦; when 𝑈𝑔 < 𝐶𝑔 − 𝑄𝑇, we can deduce that 𝑈𝑔 − 𝐶𝑔 +
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(1 − 𝑧)𝑄𝑇 − 𝑦𝑄𝑇 < 0 for any 𝑦 and 𝑧. In this setting, 𝐹′(𝑥)|𝑥=0 < 0 is right for 
any 𝑦 and 𝑧. We summarize the above conditions and attain the Proposition 1 below: 
 
Proposition 1. 
(i) When 𝑈𝑔 > 𝐶𝑔 + 𝑄𝑇, 𝑥 = 1 is the ESS for any 𝑦 and 𝑧. 
(ii) When 𝑈𝑔 > 𝐶𝑔 + 𝑄𝑇𝑦, 𝑥 = 1 is the ESS for any 𝑧. 
(iii) When 𝐶𝑔 − (1 − 𝑦)𝑄𝑇 < 𝑈𝑔 < 𝐶𝑔 + 𝑄𝑇𝑦, if 𝑦 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (1, 𝑦
′), 𝑥 = 1 is the ESS; 
if 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (0, 𝑦′) < 𝑦 < 1, 𝑥 = 0 is the ESS. 
(iv) When 𝑈𝑔 < 𝐶𝑔 − (1 − 𝑦)𝑄𝑇, 𝑥 = 0 is the ESS for any 𝑧. 
(v) When 𝑈𝑔 < 𝐶𝑔 − 𝑄𝑇, 𝑥 = 0 is the ESS for any 𝑦 and 𝑧. 
 
  
                      (a)                          (b) 
  
                      (c)                          (d) 
Fig. 2. Phase diagrams for the strategy of local governments 
Note: (a) 𝑈𝑔 > 𝐶𝑔 + 𝑄𝑇; (b) 𝑦 < 𝑦 =
𝑈𝑔−𝐶𝑔
𝑄𝑇
; (c) 𝑦 > 𝑦1 =
𝑈𝑔+𝑄𝑇−𝐶𝑔
𝑄𝑇
; (d) 𝑈𝑔 < 𝐶𝑔 − 𝑄𝑇. The 
direction of the arrow represents the direction of the strategy’s evolutionary trend. 
 
We utilize Fig. 2 to facilitate the observation of the evolutionary trend by readers. 
As Proposition 1(i) shows, when local governments can acquire sufficient green policy 
support by implementing supervision policy, they would promote green tourism pattern 
without considering the behaviors of tourism enterprises and tourists (see Fig. 2[a]). 
For example, central government provides a sufficiently high financial support to the 
local governments. Proposition 1(ii) indicates that the strategy of tourism enterprises 
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can independently affect the strategy stable states of local governments under certain 
condition (see Fig. 2[b]). Furthermore, the fewer tourism firms adopt green tourism 
innovation, the more likely it is that local governments adopt the green supervision 
strategy. As a result, it is beneficial for tourism firms to adopt green tourism pattern 
actively during the initial phase of green tourism market, when there are relatively few 
green enterprises. Proposition 1(iii) implies that when 𝑈𝑔 is moderate, the decisions 
of tourism firms and tourists will jointly affect the strategy stability of local 
governments. Specifically, the more the number of tourism enterprises that adopt green 
tourism, the higher is the motivation among local governments to implement green 
supervision. Proposition 1(iv) demonstrates that when green policy support is relatively 
low (𝑈𝑔 < 𝐶𝑔 − (1 − 𝑦)𝑄𝑇), the local governments may not consider the decision of 
tourists (see Fig. 2[c]). As Proposition 1(v) shows, if green policy support is very low, 
the local governments have no motivation to implement green incentive mechanism 
(see Fig. 2[d]). At this time, the central government should provide higher financial 
support and/or strengthen the work performance management of local governments. 
Strategy stability analysis of tourism enterprises  
According to Eq. (4), we can explicitly discover that the decisions of local 
governments and tourists jointly influence the tourism enterprises’ decision making. 
For the sake of convenience, we set 𝑥′ =
𝑧(𝑐−𝑝1−𝑝2)+𝑝2−𝑏
𝑇
 and 𝑧" =
𝑝2−𝑏−𝑇𝑥
𝑝1+𝑝2−𝑐
, both of 
which are the roots of 𝐹(𝑦) = 0, except at 𝑦 = 0 and 𝑦 = 1. 
If 𝑥 = 𝑥′ or 𝑧 = 𝑧", then 𝐹(𝑦) ≡ 0 is suitable for any 𝑦. This means that any 
green innovation strategy of tourism enterprises is a stable strategy. If 𝑥 ≠ 𝑥′ and 𝑧 ≠
𝑧", from the first derivative of 𝐹(𝑦), the following equation can be obtained. 
𝐹′(𝑦) = (1 − 2𝑦)𝑄[𝑇𝑥 + 𝑧(𝑝2 + 𝑝1 − 𝑐) + 𝑏 − 𝑝2]            (8) 
It is assumed that the green innovation cost is not too high, that is, 𝑐 ≤ 𝑝1 + 𝑝2, 
or else no stakeholder, including the government, will take part in the green activity,. 
That is to say, we do not consider the case 𝑐 > 𝑝1 + 𝑝2. Observing Eq. (8), if 𝑏 > 𝑝2, 
we can explicitly derive that [𝑇𝑥 + 𝑧(𝑝2 + 𝑝1 − 𝑐) + 𝑏 − 𝑝2] > 0 is right for any 𝑥 
and 𝑧 ; then, 𝐹′(𝑥)|𝑥=1 < 0 . When 𝑏 < 𝑝2 , if 𝑧(𝑝2 + 𝑝1 − 𝑐) + 𝑏 > 𝑝2 , then 
[𝑇𝑥 + 𝑧(𝑝2 + 𝑝1 − 𝑐) + 𝑏 − 𝑝2] > 0  for any 𝑥 , which implies 𝐹
′(𝑥)|𝑥=1 < 0 ; 
likewise, if 𝑇𝑥 + 𝑏 > 𝑝2 , we also can derive that 𝐹
′(𝑥)|𝑥=1 < 0  for any 𝑧 . In 
addition, when 𝑧(𝑝2 + 𝑝1 − 𝑐) + 𝑏 < 𝑝2 or 𝑇𝑥 + 𝑏 < 𝑝2, we can prove that if 𝑥 <
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min (1, 𝑥′) or 𝑧 < min (1, 𝑧"), then 𝐹′(𝑥)|𝑥=0 < 0; however, if max (0, 𝑥
′) < 𝑥 < 1 
or max (0, 𝑧") < 𝑧 < 1, we get 𝐹′(𝑥)|𝑥=1 < 0. According to the above conditions that 
ensure 𝐹′(𝑥)|𝑥=1 < 0, we can obtain Proposition 2: 
 
Proposition 2. 
(i) When 𝑏 > 𝑝2, 𝑦 = 1 is the ESS for any 𝑥 and 𝑧. 
(ii) When 𝑏 < 𝑝2 , if 𝑧(𝑝2 + 𝑝1 − 𝑐) + 𝑏 > 𝑝2 , 𝑦 = 1  is the ESS for any 𝑥 ; if 
𝑇𝑥 + 𝑏 > 𝑝2, 𝑦 = 1 is the ESS for any 𝑧. 
(iii) When 𝑧(𝑝2 + 𝑝1 − 𝑐) + 𝑏 < 𝑝2 , if 𝑥 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (1, 𝑥
′) , 𝑦 = 0  is the ESS; if 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (0, 𝑥′) < 𝑥 < 1, 𝑦 = 1 is the ESS. 
(iv) When 𝑇𝑥 + 𝑏 < 𝑝2, if 𝑧 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (1, 𝑧"), 𝑦 = 0 is the ESS; if 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (0, 𝑧") < 𝑧 <
1, 𝑦 = 1 is the ESS. 
 
    
                      (a)                               (b)                              
      
                    (c)                              (d)           
Fig. 3. Phase diagram of the strategy of tourism enterprises  
Note: (a) 𝑏 > 𝑝2; (b) 𝑏 < 𝑝2  and 𝑥 > 𝑥 =
𝑝2−𝑏
𝑇
 or 𝑧 > 𝑧 =
𝑝2−𝑏
(𝑝2+𝑝1−𝑐)
; (c) 𝑧 < 𝑧 =
𝑝2−𝑏
(𝑝2+𝑝1−𝑐)
, 
wherein 𝑥′ =
𝑧(𝑐−𝑝1−𝑝2)+𝑝2−𝑏
𝑇
 ; (d) 𝑥 < 𝑥 =
𝑝2−𝑏
𝑇
, wherein 𝑧" =
𝑝2−𝑏−𝑇𝑥
𝑝1+𝑝2−𝑐
. The direction of the 
arrow direction represents the direction of the strategy’s evolutionary trend. 
 
Fig. 3 shows the phase diagram of the strategy of tourism enterprises under 
different conditions. Proposition 2(i) reveals that tourism enterprises would like to 
 16 
adopt green innovation strategy spontaneously as long as the brand benefit is greater 
than the price of the non-green product (see Fig. 3[a]). As a result, local governments 
can improve brand benefit to stimulate tourism firms to adopt the green tourism pattern 
instead of only using monitoring policies. For example, local governments can grant 
tourism firms green certifications to enhance their brand image. Proposition 2(ii) 
indicates that when brand benefit of tourism enterprises is moderate, the local 
governments’ strategy or tourists’ purchasing strategy can independently encourage 
tourism enterprises to implement green innovation when the proportion of their positive 
strategies is high enough (see Fig. 3[b]). From Proposition 2(iii) and (iv), we conclude 
that when the brand benefit is relatively low, the decision of tourism enterprises is 
affected by the strategies of local governments and tourists (see Fig. 3[c] and [d]). Only 
under the condition that the rates of local governments adopting green supervision and 
tourists purchasing green products are both high enough will the tourism firms select 
green tourism. 
Strategy stability analysis of tourists  
It is easy to find that the decision making of tourists is only related to the decision 
of tourism enterprises, according to Eq. (6). It clearly shows that tourists’ purchase 
decision is made on the basis of their own utility but independent of the local 
governments’ decision, which is more consistent with the reality. For the sake of 
simplicity of representation, we define 𝑦" =
𝑈−𝑝2
2𝑈+𝑟−𝑝1−𝑝2
, which is one of the roots of 
𝐹(𝑧) = 0, except at 𝑧 = 0 and 𝑧 = 1.  
If 𝑦 = 𝑦", then 𝐹(𝑧) ≡ 0 is suitable for any 𝑧. This implies that any purchasing 
strategy of the tourists is a stable strategy, that is, the strategy chosen will not change 
over time. If 𝑦 ≠ 𝑦", we can obtain two possible stable points: 𝑧1 = 0 or 𝑧2 = 1 
from 𝐹(𝑧) = 0. Taking the first derivative of 𝐹(𝑧) yields the following equation. 
𝐹′(𝑧) = (1 − 2𝑧)𝑄[𝑦(2𝑈 + 𝑟 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2) − (𝑈 − 𝑝2)]         (9) 
Observing Eq. (9), we derive that if 2𝑈 + 𝑟 < 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 , together with given 
condition 𝑈 > 𝑝2, then [𝑦(2𝑈 + 𝑟 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2) − (𝑈 − 𝑝2)] < 0 is right for any 𝑦. It 
is easy to check that 𝐹′(𝑧)|𝑧=0 < 0. When 2𝑈 + 𝑟 > 𝑝1 + 𝑝2, if 𝑦 < min (1, 𝑦"), we 
obtain that [𝑦(2𝑈 + 𝑟 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2) − (𝑈 − 𝑝2)] < 0 , resulting in 𝐹′(𝑧)|𝑧=0 < 0 ; 
However, when max (0, 𝑦") < 𝑦 < 1, then [𝑦(2𝑈 + 𝑟 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2) − (𝑈 − 𝑝2)] > 0, 
leading to 𝐹′(𝑧)|𝑧=1 < 0. Accordingly, Proposition 3 can be obtained. 
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Proposition 3. 
(i) When 2𝑈 + 𝑟 < 𝑝1 + 𝑝2, 𝑧 = 0 is the ESS for any 𝑦. 
(ii) When 2𝑈 + 𝑟 > 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 , if 𝑦 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (1, 𝑦") , 𝑧 = 0  is the ESS; if 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (0, 𝑦") < 𝑦 < 1, 𝑧 = 1 is the ESS. 
 
       
                    (a)                               (b) 
Fig. 4. Phase diagram of the strategy of tourists 
Note: (a) 2𝑈 + 𝑟 < 𝑝1 + 𝑝2; (b) 2𝑈 + 𝑟 > 𝑝1 + 𝑝2, where 𝑦" =
𝑈−𝑝2
2𝑈+𝑟−𝑝1−𝑝2
. The direction of the 
arrow represents the direction of the strategy’s evolutionary trend. 
 
The readers can understand the strategy evolutionary trend of tourists with the 
assistance of Fig. 4. From Proposition 3(i), it is shown that when green preference of 
tourists is relatively small, it cannot motivate the tourists to accept green tourism pattern, 
which would lead more tourism enterprises to adopt the traditional tourism strategy (see 
Fig. 4[a]). This implies that the green preference of consumers is an important incentive 
that can stimulate tourism enterprises to conduct green innovation. Increasing the guests’ 
willingness to pay for green products is significant for developing sustainable tourism. 
Proposition 3(ii) confirms that when tourists have a slightly higher green preference, 
the green tourism strategy of firms is the critical factor that encourages the tourists to 
accept green tourism. Concretely, it is more likely for tourists to choose green tourism 
pattern if there are more green tourism firms (see Fig. 4[b]). 
ESS analysis among stakeholders 
According to the above strategy stability analysis of each stakeholder, we can 
explicitly say that the stable strategy varies under different circumstances. For instance, 
as long as the brand benefit of tourism enterprises and green preference of tourists are 
high, the green tourism products will be accepted by all stakeholders even if local 
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governments do not implement green supervision. We now discuss the ESS between 
tourism enterprises and tourists without the government’s green supervision. 
From the replicator dynamic equations (4) and (6), we can deduce that the dynamic 
system has the following possible equilibrium strategy set: (0,0)(0,1)(1,0)(1,1). When 
0 < 𝑦", 𝑧" < 1 , (𝑦", 𝑧")  is also a possible stable strategy. Based on the stability 
theorem of differential equation, when the determinant 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝐽  and trace 𝑡𝑟𝐽  of the 
Jacobi matrix satisfy the conditions: 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝐽 > 0 and 𝑡𝑟𝐽 < 0, the strategy is an ESS 
(Friedman, 1991). Accordingly, we can work out the Jacobi matrix 𝐽 of replicator 
dynamic equations of tourism enterprises and tourists as follows: 
𝐽 = [
𝜕𝐹(𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝐹(𝑦)
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝐹(𝑧)
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝐹(𝑧)
𝜕𝑧
] = [
(1 − 2𝑦)𝑄[𝑇𝑥 + 𝑧𝐸 + 𝐴] (1 − 𝑦)𝑦𝑄𝐸
(1 − 𝑧)𝑧𝑄(𝐵 + 𝐶) (1 − 2𝑧)𝑄[𝑦(𝐵 + 𝐶) − 𝐵]
] (10) 
Here, the parameters are as follows: 𝐴 = 𝑏 − 𝑝2; 𝐵 = 𝑈 − 𝑝2; 𝐶 = 𝑈 + 𝑟 − 𝑝1; 
𝐷 = 𝑝1 − 𝑐 + 𝑏 ; and 𝐸 = 𝑝2 + 𝑝1 − 𝑐 . From Eq. (10), we can derive the 
corresponding trace 𝑡𝑟𝐽 = 𝑎11 + 𝑎22  and determinant 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝐽 = 𝑎11𝑎22 − 𝑎12𝑎21, as 
given below: 
{
𝑡𝑟𝐽 = (1 − 2𝑦)𝑄[𝑇𝑥 + 𝑧𝐸 + 𝐴] + (1 − 2𝑧)𝑄[𝑦(𝐵 + 𝐶) − 𝐵]
𝑑𝑒𝑡𝐽 = (1 − 2𝑦)(1 − 2𝑧)𝑄2[𝑇𝑥 + 𝑧𝐸 + 𝐴][𝑦(𝐵 + 𝐶) − 𝐵]   
                                                     −(1 − 𝑦)𝑦(1 − 𝑧)𝑧𝑄2𝐸(𝐵 + 𝐶)
      (11) 
 
Table 1. Strategy stability and conditions of the dynamic system without government supervision 
 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐽 Sign 𝑇𝑟𝐽 Sign Stability Conditions 
(0,0) −𝑄2𝐴𝐵 + (𝑏 − 𝑈)𝑄 − ESS 𝐴 < 0 
(0,1) −𝑄2𝐴𝐶 + −(𝐴 − 𝐵)𝑄 − ESS 
𝐴 > 0 and 𝐶 <
0 
(1,0) 𝑄2𝐷𝐵 + 𝑄(𝐷 + 𝐵) + Unstable Any condition 
(1,1) 𝑄2𝐷𝐶 + −𝑄(𝐶 + 𝐷) − ESS 𝐶 > 0 
(𝑦", 𝑧") 0  
−(1 − 𝑦)𝑦(1 − 𝑧)𝑧𝑄2𝐸(𝐵
+ 𝐶) 
Uncertain 
Saddle 
point 
Any condition 
Note: the 𝐴 = 𝑏 − 𝑝2, 𝐵 = 𝑈 − 𝑝2, 𝐶 = 𝑈 + 𝑟 − 𝑝1, 𝐷 = 𝑝1 − 𝑐 + 𝑏. 
 
Suppose that local governments do not implement a green incentive mechanism. 
The tourism enterprises would set a sufficiently high sales price for the unit green 
product, that is, 𝑝1 − 𝑐 + 𝑏 > 0 from a rational point of view. From the Jacobi matrix 
𝐽, we can analyze the stability of the equilibrium strategy and find out the corresponding 
conditions shown in Table 1, where 𝑦"  and 𝑧"  are as defined in the previous 
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subsection. Among them, the three points (0,0), (1,0) and (1,1) are asymptotic ESS of 
the dynamic system (corresponding to the following strategy combinations of tourism 
enterprises and tourists: adopt traditional tourism and buy non-green products; adopt 
green tourism and buy non-green or green products). The points (0,1) or (𝑦", 𝑧") 
indicates that the system is in a state of temporary stability and deviates from this state 
over time. From Table 1, we can get Proposition 4, which shows the strategy stability 
between tourism enterprises and tourists. 
 
Proposition 4. Under the precondition that local governments do not implement green 
incentive mechanism (𝑇 = 0 and/or 𝑥 = 0), we have: 
(i) When 𝑏 < 𝑝2, the (𝑦, 𝑧) = (0,0) is an ESS. 
(ii) When 𝑏 > 𝑝2 and 𝑈 + 𝑟 < 𝑝1, the (𝑦, 𝑧) = (1,0) is an ESS. 
(iii) The (𝑦, 𝑧) = (0,1) is not an ESS under any condition. 
(iv) When 𝑟 > 𝑝1 − 𝑈, the (𝑦, 𝑧) = (1,1) is an ESS. 
 
Proposition 4(i) shows that when brand benefit is relatively small, no tourism 
enterprises will adopt green tourism mode in the end, leading to no green products for 
tourists to buy. This also can explain the reason why (𝑦, 𝑧) = (0,1) is not an ESS 
under any condition. Proposition 4(ii) indicates that if parameter 𝑏 is large enough, 
the enterprises have the motivation to adopt green tourism. However, the tourists finally 
choose the non-green products due to the lower green preference. Notice that it is hard 
for this case to become a reality, even if we have proved it theoretically. This is because 
the condition 𝑏 > 𝑝2 is unlikely to happen when the tourists do not buy green products. 
It is easy to understand Proposition 4(iii) owing to no green products for tourists to 
purchase. Proposition 4(iv) highlights that when tourists have high enough green 
preference, the dynamic system will evolve to ESS (1,1), no matter what the brand 
benefit is. 
In order to validate the accuracy of the above analyses, we employ the numerical 
experiment by using the software Matlab2016 to illustrate the dynamic evolutionary 
process of the various strategies. Meanwhile, some important management implications 
can be proposed. We focus on examining the dynamic evolutionary trend and normalize 
the demand to 1. The basic parameters are given by 𝑈 = 10, 𝑟 = 1, 𝑝1 = 12, 𝑝2 =
8, 𝑐 = 5, which satisfies the condition 𝑈 + 𝑟 < 𝑝1. To examine the effect of brand 
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benefit, we make 𝑏 change over interval [2,15.5] in incremental steps of 0.9. Fig. 5 
depicts the evolutionary process of the dynamic system between tourism firms and 
tourists without government green supervision. We set basic parameters value as: 𝑈 =
10; 𝑝1 = 14, ; 𝑝2 = 7; 𝑏 = 8; and  𝑐 = 8, which satisfies the condition 𝑏 > 𝑝2. We let 
green preference 𝑟 of tourists vary between 0 and 13.5, in steps of 0.9, to observe its 
impact on the ESS between tourism firms and tourists (see Fig. 6).  
 
 
Fig. 5. Dynamic evolutionary diagram of tourism enterprises and tourists by changing 𝑏 
 
Fig. 5 illustrates that when brand benefit is relatively small (blue lines), the tourism 
enterprises finally have no motivation to implement green tourism innovation. On the 
contrary, when it is more than 𝑝2 (red lines), the tour firms would adopt the green 
tourism innovation strategy. Furthermore, when the initial state 𝑦0 and 𝑧0 are both 
very low, the dynamic system evolves monotonically to ESS (0,0); for example, 
(𝑦0, 𝑧0) = (0.1, 0.2). When one (both) of them is (are) sufficiently high, the dynamic 
system first has an evolutionary trend toward ESS (1,1) on account of the imitative 
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behavior of members but finally evolves to ESS (0,0). This implies that the stakeholders’ 
behavior can significantly interact with each other in the short run. Furthermore, the 
higher the initial rate of adoption of green behavior by the stakeholders, the stronger is 
their imitative behavior. 
 
  
Fig. 6. Dynamic evolutionary diagram of tourism enterprises and tourists with change in 𝑟 
 
Fig. 6 demonstrates that the dynamic system finally evolves to ESS (1,0), even if 
tourists have lower green preference owing to the relatively high brand benefit. When 
tourists’ green preference is sufficiently high, the evolutionary path of the dynamic 
system will finally reach ESS (1,1). Besides, Fig. 6 has similar evolutionary 
characteristics to that of Fig. 5. 
We can conclude from Proposition 4 that when brand benefit of tourism enterprises 
and green preference of tourists are relatively low, it is impossible to ensure the 
simultaneous adoption of green operation pattern by tourism enterprises and purchase 
of green tourism products by the tourists. This case is not uncommon at the early stage 
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of green tourism market in some developing countries. Considering China’s current 
situation, wherein environmental protection awareness among the public is not very 
high, it is ineluctable that central government should create a green incentive 
mechanism to promote sustainable development of tourism. From the above strategy 
stability analysis of each stakeholder, we conclude that local governments’ supervision 
can affect the decision of tourism firms. Furthermore, when green preference of tourists 
satisfies the condition 𝑈 + 𝑟 > 𝑝1, enough green companies can drive tourists to buy 
green products in the long term. Next, we analyze the ESS between tourism enterprises 
and tourists under the green incentive mechanism of government.  
The aim of local governments implementing green incentive mechanism is to 
stimulate tourism firms to adopt green innovation and tourists to purchase green 
products, that is, ESS (1,1). Here, we just identify the condition that can stimulate the 
dynamic system to evolve into the ideal green tourism pattern ESS (1,1,1). From Eq. 
(11), we have 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝐽𝑠 = 𝑄
2[𝑇𝑥 + 𝑝1 − 𝑐 + 𝑏](𝑈 + 𝑟 − 𝑝1) and 𝑡𝑟𝐽𝑠 = −𝑄(𝑇𝑥 − 𝑐 +
𝑏 + 𝑈 + 𝑟) under ESS (1,1). Accordingly, the local governments can require tourism 
enterprises to set lower unit price of green products that can ensure 𝑝1 < 𝑈 + 𝑟 by 
implementing the green incentive mechanism, which can guarantee 𝑇𝑥 + 𝑝1 − 𝑐 +
𝑏 > 0 . By substituting 𝑦 = 1  and 𝑧 = 1  into the Eq. (7), we have 𝐹′(𝑥) =
(1 − 2𝑥)(𝑈𝑔 − 𝐶𝑔 − 𝑄𝑇). To ensure that local governments have the motivation to 
implement green incentive mechanism, the condition (1 − 2𝑥)(𝑈𝑔 − 𝐶𝑔 − 𝑄𝑇)|𝑥=1 <
0, that is, 𝑈𝑔 − 𝐶𝑔 > 𝑄𝑇  should be satisfied. Consequently, Proposition 5 can be 
obtained. 
 
Proposition 5. The central government can require local governments to implement 
green incentive mechanism that 𝑇 satisfies the condition: 
𝑐−𝑏−𝑝1
𝑥
< 𝑇 <
𝑈𝑔−𝐶𝑔
𝑄
 to drive 
the dynamic system to evolve into the ideal green tourism state, that is, ESS (1,1,1). 
 
Proposition 5 identifies the condition that contributes to green tourism 
development. Observing expression 
𝑐−𝑏−𝑝1
𝑥
, it is found that the lower bound is 
increasing with the decrease of 𝑥 . The fewer the number of firms adopting green 
tourism, the higher the green incentive intensity is. This implies that the more local 
governments implement green supervision, the more conducive the implementation of 
green incentive mechanism is. Similarly, the upper bound of local governments 
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implementing green incentive mechanism is decreasing with market demand. This 
suggests that central government should take the lead in implementing the green 
incentive mechanism in areas where tourism scale is relatively small. In order to make 
sure that local governments implement green incentive mechanism, the central 
government should offer sufficient green policy support, viz., 𝑈𝑔 >
(𝑐−𝑏−𝑝1)𝑄
𝑥
+ 𝐶𝑔. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Dynamic evolutionary diagram of the dynamic system with change in 𝑇 
 
Fig. 7 examines the role of local governments’ green incentive mechanism on the 
basis of the following parameters value:  𝑈 = 10, ; 𝑏 = 3;  𝑟 = 1, ; 𝑝1 = 10, ; 𝑝2 =
8;  𝑐 = 18; and 𝑥0 = 1. We make parameter 𝑇 change over the interval [0, 12], in 
steps of 0.75. It can be found that when the green incentive intensity is relatively low 
(blue lines), the local governments cannot drive tourism enterprises and tourists to 
select green tourism pattern. On the contrary, when the green incentive intensity is high 
enough (red lines), the green incentive mechanism can motivate traditional tourism to 
successfully turn toward green development. It is of great importance for local 
governments to achieve a reasonable incentive intensity, given the thresholds 
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mentioned above. 
Conclusions and management implications 
In the context of sustainable development, we model a dynamic evolutionary game 
among local governments, tourism enterprises, and tourists by incorporating green 
policy support of central government, brand benefit of tourism enterprises, and green 
preference of tourists. We discuss the strategy evolutionary process of each stakeholder 
and explore the green incentive mechanism for local governments to promote green 
tourism development. By numerical experiments, we analyze the impacts of some 
important parameters on the decision-making of each stakeholder. The main 
conclusions and managerial insights from evolutionary analyses are as follows.  
First, local governments’ decision making depends on the simultaneous adoption 
of strategies by tourism enterprises and tourists. Similarly, tourism enterprises’ strategy 
can be affected by the decisions of both local governments and tourists. It is worth 
noting that local governments’ supervision behavior cannot directly impact the 
purchasing decision of tourists, but it can indirectly drive the tourists to buy green 
tourism products by incentivizing tourism firms to sell green products. The research 
also indicates that some influencing factors, such as social environmental benefit and 
additional environmental governance cost, cannot affect the strategy stability of the 
dynamic system even if they exist in reality. Hence, the local governments should focus 
on enhancing some relatively important factors, such as brand benefit of tourism 
enterprises and green preference of tourists. 
Second, when potential brand benefit is relatively high, tourism enterprises would 
want to voluntarily adopt a green innovation strategy. As a result, local governments 
can improve brand benefit to motivate tourism firms to take up the green tourism pattern; 
the benefit can include giving green tourism enterprises some policy support, and/or 
granting them green certifications. Therefore, we conclude that when visitors have 
higher green preference, tourism enterprises would adopt a green innovation strategy, 
even if local governments do not implement supervision policy. This implies that green 
preference of tourists can independently guide tour enterprises to implement green 
tourism innovation through the market mechanism. This is an effective way to 
strengthen the propaganda of environmental knowledge so as to enhance the tourists’ 
environment awareness. 
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Last, it can be concluded that the strategy evolutionary process is influenced by 
initial states and corresponding stable conditions. The initial states of stakeholders 
taking part in green activities can affect the short-term decisions of stakeholders but 
evolutionary stable conditions can influence the decision making of each stakeholder 
based on the long-term perspective. It is sensible of enterprises and/or local 
governments to make decisions in the light of the thresholds. Given the green incentive 
condition 
𝑐−𝑏−𝑝1
𝑥
< 𝑇 <
𝑈𝑔−𝐶𝑔
𝑄
, we infer that the dynamic system can evolve into the ideal 
green tourism state: ESS (1,1,1). It is necessary for all stakeholders to make joint efforts 
to realize the ideal development path of green tourism. In order to stimulate local 
governments to perform their duty voluntarily, the central government should enhance 
green policy support by providing financial subsidy and/or affirming local governments’ 
work. Local governments can promote the green tourism business mode by supporting 
green technology development, product designing, energy supply, personnel training, 
and other related works, especially by creating a reasonable green incentive intensity 
for tourism enterprises. Most importantly, it can be suggested that the government 
should first implement green incentive mechanism in the areas where tourism scale is 
relatively small. 
We acknowledge a few limitations of our model due to some of its basic 
assumptions. First, we focused on discussing the game behavior among stakeholders in 
the vertical dimension; so, horizontal competition in the form of multiple competitors 
could be analyzed in future studies. The mathematical model in this paper, was 
influenced by China’s tourism industry. Although it has provided some guidelines for 
similar developing countries, future research could establish a more general model, 
which could also be applied to developed countries. Moreover, we assumed that the 
price of tourism product is constant during a certain period. Although it is more 
complex and challenging, time-varying price could be studied by constructing a profit 
function. Nevertheless, our research does shed light on the decision making of key 
stakeholders in sustainable tourism, especially by the government.  
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